Professor Verity Winship recently blogged for Oxford Business Law Blog about a paper she co-authored with Matteo Gargantini, titled Private Ordering of Shareholder Litigation in the EU and the US.

As shareholder litigation expands globally and increases in economic significance, so does the interest of parties in fighting over the rules that govern it and determine its scope. Sometimes this fight is over legislative or regulatory limits, but it can also occur in the context of private ordering. To what extent can the players in shareholder litigation—companies, management, shareholders, and other investors—set the rules for litigation through private agreement? These agreements may be negotiated and involve explicit consent, in a clear analog to sophisticated commercial contracts. But at other times the locus of this private ordering is itself contested. In particular, the question arises whether provisions in charters and bylaws or in prospectuses may shape litigation.

Full blog post at Oxford Business Law Blog