University of Illinois political science professor Damarys Canache is a native of Venezuela and studies its politics. She spoke with News Bureau business and law editor Phil Ciciora about the Biden administration’s decision to ease sanctions on Venezuela, the migration crisis and the upcoming 2024 Venezuelan presidential election.
What is the backstory behind nearly two decades of U.S. sanctions on Venezuela?
The U.S. began imposing sanctions on Venezuela in 2005 during the George W. Bush administration. The sanctions targeted those involved in corrupt, criminal and anti-democratic activities. During the Trump administration, the scope of those sanctions was significantly expanded, moving beyond individually targeted sanctions to include broader financial and sectoral sanctions.
In theory, the objective of this strategy has been to exert pressure on the Venezuelan government to compel them to change their behavior. Despite those sanctions, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has consolidated his power, and the sanctions have only worsened the economic crisis caused by his mismanagement and the corruption of Venezuelan authorities. The sanctions likely contributed to the country’s economic breakdown and to one of the most serious migration crises on the continent, with more than 7 million Venezuelans fleeing the country, according to the United Nations Refugee Agency.
Why did the Biden administration choose to ease some of the economic and financial sanctions now?
The Biden administration has backed a framework for creating electoral conditions for free, fair and competitive presidential elections in Venezuela in 2024. And after extensive negotiations facilitated by Norway, the Maduro government and the group of opposition parties under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached a deal last October. While the U.S. wasn’t directly involved in these negotiations, the Biden administration backed the deal. Responding to this deal, the U.S. government then lifted sanctions related to the oil industry and a bond trading ban in exchange.
But the relaxation of sanctions by the U.S. government is temporary. It will end in April 2024, and is contingent on the Maduro regime fulfilling its obligations under an agreement on the presidential elections between Maduro and the Venezuelan opposition party, as well as on releasing political prisoners.
In December, the Maduro government released 10 American citizens and 20 Venezuelan political prisoners. This was the relatively easy part, as Maduro was able to secure the release of a close ally, Alex Saab, as part of the prisoner exchange deal.
If the Maduro regime meets its commitments, the licenses related to the oil industry will be extended, and additional economic sanctions may be lifted. However, the sanctions will likely be reimposed if the Venezuelan government fails to comply with these commitments.
Thus, the easing of sanctions and the threat of reinstating them are being used to encourage Maduro to maintain and meet the responsibilities in conducting free and fair elections.
But fulfillment of the electoral agreement poses a more complex scenario. Autocratic leaders like Maduro are often reluctant to give up their power. Therefore, it is crucial that the U.S. government and the international community continue to exert pressure on Maduro and his allies to fulfill his end of the bargain.
In my view, the U.S. and the international community should persist in pressuring Maduro and his allies to ensure they meet the commitment to minimal conditions for free and fair elections.
How much has U.S. policy been influenced by the migration crisis?
The Biden administration’s approach to Venezuela is undoubtedly influenced by the increasing number of Venezuelan migrants coming to the U.S. Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans who fled to other Latin American countries are now risking their lives crossing the Darién Gap to reach the Mexico-U.S. border. Therefore, improving the economic and political situation in Venezuela is crucial to encouraging Venezuelans to return and stay in their homeland.
Another factor to consider is the current instability and turmoil in the Middle East, which could affect the oil markets. Although the Venezuelan oil industry declined greatly during the Chavista period, the easing of oil-related sanctions should provide some relief and is indicative of the Biden administration’s concern about the price of crude oil.
If there were free and fair presidential elections were held in Venezuela, would Maduro lose?
Maduro has been in power for more than a decade, and he is squarely to blame for the collapse of the Venezuelan economy along with massive corruption and political repression, all of which led to the exodus of millions of Venezuelans. Maduro’s approval level is quite low, and according to a July 2023 poll, 85% of Venezuelan citizens want a political change.
It’s difficult to see why Venezuelan citizens would vote for Maduro again. Yet, Maduro and his party will control the state apparatus and resources and will likely use them to their electoral advantage, much like during previous elections in the Chavista era. Assuming a fair election, the chances of the political opposition winning will depend on their ability to unite and present a strong front to voters.
But these uncertain times in Venezuela make it difficult to make any solid predictions about the next election.
In a symbolic move, the Venezuelan people recently voted in a referendum to annex part of oil-rich Guyana. Is the Maduro regime taking a page from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s playbook in his war with Ukraine and gearing up to invade neighboring Guyana?
The conflict between Venezuela and Guyana for the possession of Esequibo, a region rich in mineral resources, has lasted for over two centuries. Until now, this conflict has been arbitrated in international courts. However, in the aftermath of the opposition primary election in December, Maduro escalated tensions with Guyana. He launched a propaganda campaign around this issue, organizing and holding a national referendum to approve the annexation of the Esequibo, appointed authorities for the region, and approved a new map of Venezuela that now includes the Esequibo.
In an electoral year, it’s not surprising to see the escalation of a territorial conflict as a strategic, albeit symbolic, move to create the “rally around the flag” effect. The question for later this year is what Maduro will do if he anticipates losing the election. Escalating the conflict to the point of invading the Esequibo could create a situation in which Maduro could justify the suspension of the presidential elections and at least remain in power for some time. This is not an impossible scenario.